Youth, Peace and Security — the decade of the YPS agenda and the question for Poland

On December 12, 2025 — the tenth anniversary of the landmark resolution 2250 — the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2807, the fourth document devoted to the Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) agenda. It did so at a singular moment: Europe is fighting its bloodiest war since 1945, the UN is grappling with the gravest financial crisis in its history, and public debate in many countries increasingly treats young people as a threat to be controlled rather than as partners to be heard. This analysis explains what the YPS agenda is, how over a decade it changed the norms of international security, where it runs up against its limits — and why Poland, a frontline state, remains in this respect an almost blank spot on the map of Europe.

The silence that was broken

For most of postwar history, young people appeared in security documents in only two roles: as victims of violence or as its potential perpetrators. The young were objects of protection or objects of suspicion — rarely actors who help build peace themselves. The Youth, Peace and Security agenda (YPS for short) was born precisely to shatter that binary scheme.

Its essence is deceptively simple. The YPS agenda is a body of international norms and national strategies that recognize young people as active and indispensable participants in preventing conflicts, resolving them and building peace once they end. Not “aid beneficiaries,” not an “at-risk group,” but partners. In practice, this means demanding that the young have a real — safe, meaningful and adequately funded — part in every phase of the peace cycle, from mediation to reconstruction.

The scale of the gap between that demand and reality is striking. Although people under thirty make up a large share of humanity — and in fragile and conflict-affected states an outright majority — they remain systematically excluded from formal politics. The average age of the world’s national leaders is 62, and people under thirty account for a mere 2.6% of parliamentarians across the globe. This disproportion is not merely a question of generational justice; it is a question of security. It breeds a deep deficit of trust between the young generation and public institutions — and where trust breaks down, the foundations of peace fall apart.

The death of a myth

To understand what makes YPS a breakthrough, one must recall the paradigm the agenda set out to overturn. For decades, policy toward young populations in the Global South was shaped by the theory of the youth bulge. In the framing of scholars such as Gunnar Heinsohn and Henrik Urdal, a surplus of young men — especially those unable to find a prestigious place in the existing social hierarchy — was said to create a structural propensity for civil wars, terrorism and coups. Urdal’s early quantitative research from 2006, covering conflicts from 1950 to 2000, seemed to bear the thesis out: countries with a large youth “bulge” were supposedly three times more likely to experience serious armed conflict.

The theory slotted perfectly into the logic of the post-2001 “war on terror.” The populous, young societies of the South came to be seen as an “arc of instability” and a natural reservoir of recruits for extremist groups. The response was hard security policy: surveillance, policing, prevention understood as containment. The result — the stigmatization and marginalization of entire generations.

The trouble is that the theory itself proved dubious. Later research — including Urdal’s own work with Jan Hoelscher from 2009, analyzing social unrest in 55 major urban centers of Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia — showed that a large population of young men does not, by itself, raise the risk of conflict. The real driver of violence is something else: the systemic exclusion of the young from political representation, from the labor market and from access to resources. The risk rises when a well-educated generation runs into economic stagnation, corruption and the absence of channels through which it could voice its aspirations.

It is precisely this reversal of perspective that is the heart of the YPS agenda. An independent study commissioned by the UN in 2018 coined the phrase the violence of exclusion to describe it: it is not youth that is the source of danger, but exclusion. Young people are not inherently prone to violence — their vulnerability to recruitment by armed groups is a symptom of institutional state failure, not a trait of a generation. The YPS agenda thus shifts the weight of policy from containing demography to structural inclusion: from investing in control to investing in participation.

From Tahrir Square to the Amman Declaration

The YPS agenda was not the brainchild of officials. It grew out of the street. In the early 2010s, a wave of protests — from the Arab Spring to youth movements in Europe, Latin America and Africa — showed that young people are the main engine of political change. And, at the same time, that once the dust settles they are as a rule pushed away from the tables where the new order is negotiated: from transition dialogues, national peace talks and constitutional reforms. That visible exclusion became the spark.

The ground had been prepared earlier. As early as 2010, the UN Inter-Agency Working Group on Youth and Peacebuilding — with the support of the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), UNDP and Search for Common Ground — drew up the “Guiding Principles on Young People’s Participation in Peacebuilding,” one of the first documents to present the young as constructive partners rather than a risk. In January 2013, the Office of the Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth was established, giving the cause a permanent platform inside the UN Secretariat.

The political breakthrough, however, came courtesy of Jordan. Sitting as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, it used its presidency in April 2015 to convene an open thematic debate — chaired by the heir to the throne, Crown Prince Al Hussein bin Abdullah II — on the role of youth in countering extremism and building peace. That debate challenged the dominant, “securitized” vision of youth and paved the way for a dedicated resolution.

The culmination was the Global Forum on Youth, Peace and Security, held in Amman on August 21–22, 2015. It gathered more than 500 participants, including 200 young peacebuilders from over 80 countries. The forum’s only youth co-organizer — the United Network of Young Peacebuilders (UNOY) — led an unprecedentedly participatory process: more than 11,000 submissions containing young people’s perspectives on conflict and security were analyzed, and a drafting team composed entirely of youth finalized the Amman Youth Declaration. That document — with its four areas of action: participation and leadership, prevention of violence, gender equality, and socioeconomic empowerment — became the intellectual foundation of resolution 2250. Much of its language and its demands passed straight into the text adopted by the Security Council less than four months later.

The normative backbone: four Security Council resolutions

The agenda’s legal architecture is built from a sequence of four thematic Security Council resolutions. Before examining each in turn, though, it is worth dispelling a common misunderstanding about their legal character. Although they are adopted in the body responsible for maintaining international peace, most of their substantive provisions use non-binding language — “calls upon,” “encourages,” “urges.” These are political norms and frameworks of influence, not hard obligations. What is binding are the procedural and administrative decisions: reporting requirements or changes to the internal workings of the UN Secretariat. The YPS agenda is thus a construction of “soft law” braced by a few hard anchors — and in that tension lies both its strength and its weakness.

Resolution 2250 (December 9, 2015). Adopted unanimously at Jordan’s initiative, it is the founding act of the entire agenda. For the first time, it formally recognized the positive contribution of young women and men to building peace and set out the five pillars around which the agenda is organized to this day: participation, protection, prevention, partnerships, and disengagement and reintegration. It was also resolution 2250 that defined “youth” for the agenda’s purposes as people aged 18–29 and commissioned the first independent study on the role of the young in peace processes.

Resolution 2419 (June 6, 2018). Prepared by Peru and Sweden, it shifted the center of gravity toward the formal negotiating table. It called on all actors to ensure the full, equal and meaningful participation of the young in negotiating and implementing peace agreements, explicitly linking the marginalization of youth to the failure of peace processes. Even then, its negotiations were difficult — China and Russia argued that youth affairs are developmental and social in nature, and thus belong not to the core of the Security Council’s mandate but to other UN bodies. That dispute over the very legitimacy of taking up the subject would return with every subsequent resolution.

Resolution 2535 (July 14, 2020). The co-authorship of the Dominican Republic and France was itself symbolic — for the first time, a non-permanent state and a permanent member of the Council worked together on a YPS resolution. Negotiated remotely in the shadow of the pandemic, it moved the agenda from the level of political declaration to that of institutional mandate. It required youth perspectives to be integrated into the planning of peace operations, mandated youth focal points in UN missions and — most crucially — established a regular biennial cycle of Secretary-General reports, permanently writing YPS into the Council’s program of work.

Resolution 2807 (December 12, 2025). Adopted unanimously on the tenth anniversary of resolution 2250, at the initiative of Guyana and Sierra Leone, it was meant to answer the agenda’s most nagging problem: the chasm between norm and implementation. It encourages states to adopt national action plans, supports the safe participation of young briefers at Council meetings and strengthens cooperation with the Peacebuilding Commission. Its history, however, is above all a history of disappointment. The co-sponsors proposed establishing a standing Informal Expert Group on YPS — modeled on the functioning, effective group for the Women, Peace and Security agenda — and moving to annual reports and annual open debates. All of these proposals were torpedoed. The permanent members, invoking the UN’s liquidity crisis and the “UN80” reform initiative, pushed for a return “to basics”; the United States, France and the United Kingdom objected to new costs, Russia and China to any expansion of the Council’s mandate. The expert group was not created, the reports remained biennial, and at China’s insistence even the term “youth-led organizations” was struck from the text as supposedly lacking legal precision. The resolution survived as a testament to consensus — but a consensus whittled down to small change.

The backdrop to this sequence is completed by two further acts. The presidential statement of December 2019, adopted under South Africa’s presidency, tied the agenda to the African “Silencing the Guns” initiative and — significantly — deliberately rejected the “radicalization” frame, stressing the constructive role of young Africans. Resolution 2553 of the same year, in turn, linked security sector reform with youth participation, recognizing that security institutions are more durable and more credible when they are representative.

Watching over it all is an analytical apparatus. The first independent progress study — The Missing Peace, led by Graeme Simpson and presented to the Council on April 23, 2018 — was based on consultations with more than four thousand young people from 27 countries, deliberately reaching beyond a narrow, privileged elite. It was this study that popularized the notion of “the violence of exclusion” and demonstrated that only a vanishingly small minority of the young ever take part in violence. The second independent study, commissioned under the Pact for the Future and led by Nanjala Nyabola, is due to be submitted in 2026; its consultation phase — the “Great Listening” (The Big Listen), under way since the fall of 2025 with global surveys and tools supported by artificial intelligence — deliberately reaches for the voices of young people beyond the centers.

The sister agenda: youth and women

The YPS agenda did not emerge in a vacuum — its direct model was the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, fifteen years its senior, launched by resolution 1325 of October 31, 2000. Both challenge the state-centric model of security and speak up for historically excluded groups; both are also — in and of themselves — unenforceable, resting on voluntary national commitments. They differ fundamentally, however, in their axis of analysis: the WPS agenda speaks of gender, YPS of age, covering young women and young men alike. That difference has consequences. It allows the YPS agenda to see the specific situation of young men — how social expectations of masculinity, for instance, can push them toward violence — but it also breeds the opposite risk. When policymakers lump “women and youth” into a single basket of vulnerability, they lose sight of the distinct agency of each group. Young women feel this most acutely, excluded three times over: from patriarchal power structures, from networks run by adult women, and from male-dominated youth organizations. The asymmetry of institutional maturity matters too: while the WPS agenda has in some states achieved statutory codification — like the American WPS Act of 2017 — the YPS agenda remains suspended on soft declarations and voluntary partnerships. It is precisely this difference in status, as we shall see, that stands out most sharply in Poland.

Five pillars and the machinery of implementation

Resolution 2250 translated its principles into five pillars, which organize the practice to this day.

Participation means the systematic inclusion of the young in decision-making and peace negotiations — not as token representation but as genuine co-decision, as with the youth quotas in Yemen’s National Dialogue or the National Youth Peace Tables in the Philippines. Protection means safeguarding the physical, digital and legal space in which young human rights defenders operate, increasingly exposed to arrest and online harassment, as well as protecting schools as places free from violence. Prevention shifts the weight from reactive hard-power measures to grassroots community-building and investment in peace education and in young “insider mediators.” Partnerships demand the dismantling of top-down funding structures and treating youth organizations as equal co-creators — as embodied by the Global Coalition on YPS, co-led by UNOY, Search for Common Ground, UNFPA and PBSO, among others. Disengagement and reintegration, finally, move away from treating young former combatants as a risk to be managed, toward trauma-sensitive strategies combining psychosocial support with vocational training.

Behind the pillars stands an elaborate institutional architecture, which has undergone significant reform in recent years. The milestone was the creation in 2022, by General Assembly resolution 76/306, of the United Nations Youth Office (UNYO) — the first dedicated and permanently funded unit for youth affairs in the Secretariat. The previous envoy model operated without a stable budget, on ad hoc grants; the new office received core funding from the UN’s regular budget and 16 permanent posts. At its head — as the first Assistant Secretary-General for Youth Affairs in history — stood Felipe Paullier of Uruguay, then 32 years old, the youngest senior official in the organization’s history. Tellingly, he defines his own role not as “representing” the voice of the young, but as making sure their concerns permeate all three pillars of the UN: development, human rights, and peace and security.

The operational heart of the agenda, however, remains the Peacebuilding Fund, managed by PBSO. It was the Fund that in 2016 launched a dedicated funding window for youth, allowing civil society organizations — including youth-led ones — to receive money directly, bypassing the traditional restriction to UN agencies. Between 2018 and 2024, the Fund invested more than US$311 million in nearly 170 projects in almost 50 countries, pledging to devote at least a quarter of its annual funds to the empowerment of women and youth.

The agenda also lives at the regional level, and it is precisely here that the European context becomes most telling for Poland. The European Union operationalizes YPS within its common security and defense policy missions, and in November 2025, at the second YPS conference in Brussels, states and partners adopted a joint declaration on the matter. The African Union — on a continent with a median age of nearly 20 — has built the strongest regional architecture, with its 2020 Continental Framework on YPS and five regional Youth Ambassadors for Peace. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is developing the parliamentary and field dimensions, and the Council of Europe — through its flagship Youth Peace Camp, whose twentieth edition took place in 2025 — links YPS with human rights education and intercultural dialogue.

The disconnect: normative ambition versus reality

It would be naive, however — and an analytical error — to stop at a catalog of achievements. Ten years after resolution 2250, the YPS agenda exists in a state that one report aptly calls “productive friction”: its normative ambition outruns its real impact, and by a distance that cannot be passed over in silence.

The hardest evidence of that chasm is money. Of the more than US$1 billion allocated to peacebuilding between 2015 and 2021, only about 10% went to initiatives aimed directly at the young — and in 2021 alone that share fell below 6%. For all the rising rhetoric, material support is shrinking. At the base of the pyramid the situation is more dramatic still: nearly half of the youth-led organizations surveyed operate on an annual budget below US$5,000. Add to that the bureaucratic barriers — complex accounting requirements that grassroots groups cannot meet — so that funds bearing the “YPS” label flow mainly through large international organizations, leaving local initiatives mere crumbs. This model of short-term, project-based financing condemns young organizations to permanent precarity, preventing them from building institutional memory and lasting programs.

The second charge is fundamental in character. A group of scholars — led by Mayssoun Sukarieh and Stuart Tannock — argues that the elites’ sudden interest in youth as a security actor stems less from a concern for empowerment than from a desire to preserve the existing order by channeling the energy of the young into safe, “compliant” tracks. Through this critical lens, the YPS agenda risks “securitizing” youth affairs: pulling education, activism and community work into the logic of countering extremism, in which a young person is first and foremost a potential risk.

The third problem is tokenism — or, as practitioners put it, “youth-washing.” The visibility of the young at global forums has grown, but real power rarely follows it. Much of the YPS infrastructure rests on “invited spaces” — advisory councils, panels, consultations created and controlled by adult institutions — into which the young are invited to speak at high-level events while being left outside the rooms where resolutions, budgets and treaties are finalized. A telling confirmation of that chasm is a global survey in which three in four respondents under thirty said that politicians do not listen to them.

Bound up with tokenism is “adultism” — the systemic treatment of age as a precondition of competence. The researchers Helen Berents and R. Fosu show that the inclusion of the young in UN documents is deeply conditional: recognition goes to those who fit acceptable templates (“youth as future leaders,” “as a resource,” “as an exception”), while those taking part in protests or non-institutional resistance are easily dismissed as immature or dangerous. That conditionality also opens the field for geopolitical games. During Security Council debates, the Russian Federation repeatedly portrayed support for young leaders as the “immoral exploitation of their inexperience” by foreign powers — arguing that the young should be “protected from political pressure” — and thus turned the protection pillar against the very idea of their participation.

The last, and perhaps deepest, is the crisis of representativeness. “Youth” is not a monolith; it is a category cut across by lines of gender, class, geography and legal status. Yet the young people chosen for global forums are disproportionately urban, educated, English-speaking and equipped with the social capital needed to navigate the thicket of visas and institutional networks. A two-tier system emerges: a “professional youth elite” on one side, and the excluded base — rural, indigenous, displaced youth — on the other. When recommendations drafted in New York drift away from the realities of young people living in the shadow of conflict, the agenda loses its most precious asset: legitimacy.

To these charges add weaknesses that are purely operational. The first is a protection deficit: as civic space around the world shrinks, young peacebuilders are at times treated as threats to national security, and yet many UN and NGO programs make no adequate provision for their safety — for cybersecurity training, legal protection or mental health support. The “do no harm” principle remains on paper. The second weakness is dependence on individuals and fragmentation: knowledge of YPS is usually concentrated in the hands of a few sympathetic officials, and when they change posts, institutional memory vanishes. The youth ecosystem itself is fragmented — organizations more often compete for scarce funds than act as a coherent coalition.

That dispersal is systemic in nature, because within the UN, YPS is “spread thin” across many units — from DPPA, through UNFPA and UNICEF, to the new Youth Office. The “UN80” reform initiative launched in March 2025 is a double-edged sword here. On the one hand — combined with the liquidity crisis — it was precisely what handed the Council’s permanent members the argument to block new oversight mechanisms in the negotiations over resolution 2807 in the name of a return “to basics.” On the other, the review of more than 40,000 mandates generated by the UN since 1946 offers a rare opportunity to consolidate the scattered youth programs and make them more effective. Which of these scenarios prevails remains an open question.

Poland: a frontline state with a policy void

And here we arrive at the question the YPS agenda poses for Poland — a question all the more pressing because the answer the Polish state has given so far is, in essence, silence.

The starting point is a paradox. Europe’s security environment is undergoing a deep transformation: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the escalation of hybrid threats and systematic disinformation campaigns have shifted the security paradigm toward societal resilience. In this reality, the YPS agenda — as the Casimir Pulaski Foundation puts it in its recommendations titled “The Young Generation in a Frontline State” — is nothing short of a ready-made international standard for including the young generation as an active actor in the security architecture. And yet Poland, a frontline state in the most literal sense, remains in terms of this agenda an almost blank spot on the map.

The sharpest indicator of this gap is the absence of a national action plan on YPS. Although the UN encourages states to adopt such plans in order to coordinate the efforts of government, universities and NGOs, Poland has not taken even the formal step of initiating such a process. There is no plan, no lead ministry, no dedicated budget line. The void stands out particularly starkly against the twin Women, Peace and Security agenda, which grew out of resolution 1325 of 2000. Here Poland did manage to act: on October 22, 2018 — not coincidentally during its term on the Security Council — it adopted its first National Action Plan for that agenda, developed by a coalition of the foreign, defense and interior ministries together with the Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment. The plan was subsequently extended to the end of 2023. Tellingly, though, even here a “NAP gap” later appeared — a two-year interval in which the state dragged its feet on finalizing the next plan, exposing a broader problem: inconsistency in honoring multilateral commitments.

Poland’s 2018–2019 term on the Security Council illustrates the character of this engagement well. Poland voted for resolution 2419 — as did all the other members — but directed its diplomatic energy elsewhere: it was Warsaw that championed the groundbreaking resolution 2475 on the protection of persons with disabilities in armed conflict, and Warsaw that pressed for the strengthening of international humanitarian law. The YPS agenda remained outside the circle of priorities. Poland is thus a reliable partner that supports the agenda — but not a leader that co-creates it, nor a state building its own domestic policy upon it.

The same is visible in the policy closest to the YPS agenda in substance: global education. Polish law — under the 2011 act on development cooperation — makes global education part of development cooperation, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly lists among its challenges “ensuring global peace and security” and “the protection of human rights,” and among its values — peace, freedom, solidarity and dignity. The main funding instrument here is the annual “Global Education” grant competition. And it is the data from that competition that lay bare the rift between declaration and practice: the competition’s budget was cut from two million zlotys in 2024 to one million in 2026, and its priorities were shifted toward supporting civil society in Belarus and the Eastern Partnership — without any orientation toward the YPS framework. In other words, the state still conceptualizes peace and security through the traditional, state-centric lens of defense, rather than through the lens of human security and the empowerment of the young.

In this vacuum, the weight of the agenda is carried by civil society and experts. The Pulaski Foundation’s recommendations point the way. The Polish Council of Youth Organizations (PROM), which serves as the national youth council and cooperates with the German youth council and the European Youth Forum, maintains Poland’s presence in European networks — though its capacity has at times been curtailed by funding fluctuations. Finally, the program of the UN Youth Delegate of the Republic of Poland itself, run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the Committee for Public Benefit, sends young representatives to join the Polish delegation to the General Assembly. The theme around which recruitment for the 81st session was organized speaks volumes: “Societal resilience as a pillar of security — the role of youth in strengthening resilience and effective crisis response.” It is a signal that young Poles themselves understand YPS in terms of state resilience. The trouble is that the delegates serve on a volunteer basis, unpaid, and have no formal pathway through which to carry the knowledge gained in New York into national security planning.

This Polish particularity fits a broader Central and Eastern European pattern. The region, united by the real threat of Russian revanchism, views YPS almost exclusively through a defensive and hybrid prism: the point is to protect the young from influence operations and psychological warfare, more rarely to make them democratic co-decision-makers. The contrast with the leaders — with Finland, the first country to adopt a national action plan (it is now implementing its second, for 2025–2028), focused on mediation, reducing polarization and development — is striking. And it is from that contrast that the key strategic conclusion flows: for the YPS agenda to gain real significance in Poland, it cannot be presented as an abstract human rights exercise. It must be understood as a pillar of national security and societal resilience.

Why this is a matter of global education — and why now

This is precisely where the YPS agenda meets the mission of global education — and the encounter is no accident. The competencies at stake in educational work with the young — critical analysis of information, cognitive resilience to disinformation, civic engagement, intercultural dialogue — are not side topics to security. They are the prevention pillar and the protection pillar translated into the language of the school and of youth work. In a frontline state contending with cognitive warfare, building that resilience is a form of building peace.

The catch is that Poland’s core curriculum remains traditional in this respect, devoid of any systemic, state-supported integration of tools aligned with the YPS agenda. A gap thus opens — and today that gap is filled mainly by the non-governmental and academic sectors. This is at once a diagnosis and a mandate: for a serious educational actor, the space for action is real and concrete. It consists in building the cognitive resilience that the school curriculum does not provide; in connecting Polish youth with a global agenda in which little more than a dozen states formally participate — roughly one in twenty at the UN; and in sober, evidence-based advocacy for Poland to finally treat the young as security partners.

The moment is exceptionally favorable. The year 2025 — the tenth anniversary of resolution 2250, the adoption of resolution 2807, the thirtieth anniversary of the World Programme of Action for Youth — closed the agenda’s first decade and opened its new chapter. Over it all stretches the horizon set by the 2024 Pact for the Future, which introduced the principle of “intergenerational justice” into the language of governance and commissioned the second independent progress study, expected in 2026. It is a rare coincidence of anniversary, new norm and fresh data — a window in which sober analysis and consistent advocacy have a chance to actually change something.

The test of the next decade

The first decade of the Youth, Peace and Security agenda was a decade of normative triumph. From the periphery of diplomacy, young people made their way into Security Council resolutions, into the budgets of peace funds, into a new office in the UN Secretariat. And yet the negotiations over resolution 2807 revealed the limits of that triumph: where real oversight mechanisms and real money begin, consensus melts away. The agenda has entered a phase in which its fate will be decided not by the number of documents adopted in New York, but by the safety, political space and resources afforded to young peacebuilders on the ground.

The same test — on a smaller, but no less acute, scale — awaits Poland. As a frontline state navigating the reality of hybrid war, Poland cannot afford to leave its youth on the margins of its peace and security policy. The question the YPS agenda poses to it is therefore, at bottom, a question about who young people are to be in Poland’s vision of security: objects of protection against hostile influence — or co-authors of the resilience on which that security rests. More depends on the answer than its apparent abstraction suggests.

Sources and further reading

• UN Security Council resolution 2250 (2015) — UN Digital Library
• UN Security Council resolution 2419 (2018) — UN Digital Library
• UN Security Council resolution 2535 (2020) — UN Digital Library
• UN Security Council resolution 2807 (2025) — UN Digital Library
• The Missing Peace: Independent Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security (2018) — UNFPA
• Youth, Peace and Security — UN Peacebuilding
• The United Nations Youth Office (UNYO) — About Us
• The Pact for the Future (A/RES/79/1, 2024) — United Nations
• The YPS agenda in the European Union — EEAS
• Second EU Conference on YPS (Brussels, 2025) — EEAS
• Youth, Peace and Security — Interpeace
• UN documents on YPS — Security Council Report
• M. Sukarieh, S. Tannock, The global securitisation of youth (Third World Quarterly, 2018) — ResearchGate
• H. Berents, R. Fosu, Constituting ‘Youth’: Conditionality and Compliance in UN Discourses on YPS (2025) — Taylor & Francis
• Advancing financing of the YPS Agenda: Beyond commitments (UNOY, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 2023) — Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation
• “The Young Generation in a Frontline State” — Casimir Pulaski Foundation
• Global education in Poland — Polish MFA / Polish Aid
• National Action Plan — the Women, Peace and Security agenda — Polish MFA
• Youth, Peace & Security Agenda — UNOY Peacebuilders